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STUDENT ARTICLE
READING THE MYSTERY PASSAGE NARROWLY: A
LEGAL, ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL ARGUMENT
AGAINST PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
MICHAEL B. HICKEY
I. INTRODUCTION
The law should not allow people to define their existence by
hastening their own deaths. The law also should not protect
from governmental intrusion all intimate and personal choices a
person makes in a lifetime. Proponents of physician assisted sui-
cide have claimed that the law should protect these choices. The
proponents argue that language in the Supreme Court's decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey' establishes a right to hasten one's
own death. This Note argues, however, that the Constitution
does not protect a decision to hasten one's own death. More-
over, although the choice for physician assisted suicide resembles
other choices protected from governmental intrusion by the
Constitution, this Note argues that physician assisted suicide is
significantly different and should not be the subject of constitu-
tional protection.
In discussing these matters, this Note argues that the
Supreme Court should read the language in Casey narrowly (i.e.,
applying it only to the facts in Casey), rather than broadly (i.e.,
applying it to circumstances surrounding physician assisted sui-
cide) for three reasons. First, the Note argues that in light of
Supreme Court precedent, people erroneously extracted the lan-
guage from the Court's Casey opinion when they applied it
broadly to physician assisted suicide. Second, the Note argues
that reading the language in Casey broadly does not comport with
* B.A., 1995, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate, 1999, Notre Dame
Law School; M.B.A. Candidate, 1999, University of Notre Dame; Thomas J.
White Scholar, 1996-98. I dedicate this note to Dr. & Mrs. John F. Creamer who
taught me love for life even in the face of death. I also would like to thank
Professor John Robinson for his valuable criticisms and comments, and my
mother and father for their constant support.
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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a basic philosophical system called limited universalism. Third,
the Note explains the real concerns of the slippery slope argu-
ment when reading this Casey language broadly. This Note con-
cludes that courts should read the mystery passage narrowly.
Supreme Court precedent, philosophical argumentation and
practical realities fail to justify reading the language in Casey
broadly.
II. THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST READING THE MYSTERY
PASSAGE BROADLY
A. Liberty Interests
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects
certain liberty interests.' These interests represent individuals'
freedom to make certain choices. If such an interest meets cer-
tain criteria, the Federal Constitution protects from governmen-
tal intrusion individuals exercising their choice. Robert Kline
argued that the Supreme Court has implemented two
approaches to determine whether a liberty interest exists:
One approach examines whether an interest is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" or is supported by the his-
tory and traditions of our nation. The second, more
expansive, approach avoids making the Constitution into a
"hidebound document" by determining which evolving lib-
erty interests are entitled to constitutional protection. 3
Whether a liberty interest exists drives the debate about the con-
stitutionality of physician assisted suicide.
Kline also distinguished between a liberty interest and a lib-
erty right. He wrote that "[a] government regulation limiting an
individual's liberty right will face strictjudicial scrutiny. A regula-
tion limiting an individual's liberty interest, will be subject to a test
balancing the state's interest against the importance of the lib-
erty interest."' According to Kline, if physician assisted suicide is
a liberty right, a government regulation that limits it must survive
2. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Robert L. Kline, Give Me Liberty And Give Me Death: Assisted Suicide as a
Fundamental Liberty Interest, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 527, 529-30 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
4. Id. at 532.
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strict judicial scrutiny to be constitutional. If physician assisted
suicide is a liberty interest, however, a government regulation
that limits it merely must survive a balancing test between the
individual and the state's interests. Therefore, whether physician
assisted suicide is a liberty right or interest significantly impacts
the hurdle through which the regulation must leap to be
constitutional.
Attempting to provide guidance about what liberty interests
should be protected, Thomas Grey has argued that we have an
"unwritten Constitution" that protects some liberty interests that
the Constitution does not enumerate.5 Grey suggested that our
Constitution entails a concept of "higher law" which protects
"natural rights."6 Upon this basis, Grey built a theory of constitu-
tional law that encourages judges to enforce rights that the Con-
stitution does not mention.
First, Grey constructed the "pure interpretive model,"' with
which he disagrees. It is an interpretation that focuses on the
text of the Constitution and entails looking to the purposes
behind the Constitution to find constitutional norms.' The pure
interpretive model differs from Grey's own interpretation of the
Constitution in that it does not include the "courts' additional
role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual lib-
erty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is
not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitu-
tion."9 Thus, the primary difference is that the pure interpretive
model imposes norms found only in the Constitution, and Grey's
theory imposes norms "of basic national ideals of individual lib-
erty and fair treatment[." Grey's "living Constitution" allows the
judiciary to develop and shape the content of the abstract rights
found in the Constitution.1"
Grey's defense for his living Constitution proposition boils
down to two arguments: first, if courts accept the pure interpre-
tive model, they must abandon all of the procedural and substan-
tive due process doctrines, especially in areas of criminal
procedure." Grey argued that the courts have implemented
norms not found in the Constitution in establishing these doc-
trines. Because Grey thought that it is wrong to abandon such
5. See generally Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27
STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
6. Id. at 715.
7. Id. at 705.
8. See id. at 706 n.9.
9. Id. at 706.
10. See id. at 709.
11. See id. at 711.
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doctrines, he argued that courts should perpetuate the living
Constitution.
Similarly, Grey's second defense was essentially that courts
have always been implementing norms not mentioned or
implied in the Constitution. Thus, Grey thought that courts
could continue to do so. Grey summarized his argument:
[T]here was an original understanding, both implicit and
textually expressed, that unwritten higher law principles
had constitutional status. From the very beginning, and
continuously until the Civil War, the courts acted on that
understanding and defined and enforced such principles
as part of their function of judicial review. Aware of that
history, the framers of the 14th amendment reconfirmed
the original understanding through the "majestic generali-
ties" of section I. And ever since, again without significant
break, the courts have openly proclaimed and enforced
unwritten constitutional principles. 2
It was against the backdrop of these theories that the Court
approached the question of substantive due process in the 1980s
and 1990s.
B. Cruzan
The Supreme Court has decided a long line of cases regard-
ing an individual's right to make a decision free from govern-
mental intrusion. The Supreme Court has established that this
right includes protection for some decisions about marriage,"3
procreation, 14 contraception,' 5 family relationships,' 6 and child
12. Id. at 717.
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia statute
prohibiting interracial marriages violated both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(holding that Oklahoma statute requiring compulsory sterilization after a third
conviction for a felony involving "moral turpitude" violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that
Massachusetts statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives by unmarried
persons violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that Connecticut statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptive devices violated the right of married
persons to use contraceptives).
16. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a
zoning ordinance preventing a woman from living with her two grandsons
violated the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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rearing and education.17 Seventeen years after the Supreme
Court decided in Roe v. Wade'8 that a woman has a right to termi-
nate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability-i.e., a right to end the
developing life of the fetus-the Court considered in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health 9 whether a patient has a
right to be free from unwanted, life-sustaining medical
treatment.
In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state
as a result of a severe car crash, and her parents wanted to termi-
nate her artificial nutrition and hydration. The hospital would
not do so without a court order, so the Cruzans brought a declar-
atory judgment action. The trial court found that there was virtu-
ally no hope that Nancy Cruzan would ever come out of her
persistent vegetative state. 2° Only the tubes that fed her nutri-
tion and hydration sustained Nancy's life. Although all knew it
would cause her death, Nancy's parents sought to have those
tubes removed.21
The state trial court determined that Nancy had a funda-
mental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse
or direct withdrawal of life sustaining medical procedures. 22 The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. Although the state
supreme court acknowledged the common-law doctrine of
informed consent, which entails a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, the court hesitated to apply that doctrine to
the facts of this case. 23 The Missouri Supreme Court declined to
hold that the State Constitution guaranteed a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment in every circumstance, and
expressed reservations about whether the Federal Constitution
did either.24 Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court held that
Nancy's parents failed to provide clear and convincing evidence
that Nancy's wish actually was to terminate the life-sustaining
medical treatment.
25
17. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that
Oregon statute requiring all children between the ages of eight and sixteen to
attend public school violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that Nebraska
statute prohibiting the teaching in school of modem languages other than
English violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
20. See id. at 266.
21. See id. at 267-68.
22. See id. at 268.
23. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Mo. 1988).
24. See id. at 417-18.
25. See id. at 424.
1998]
572 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
Affirming the Missouri Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
of the United States opined that "[lt] he principle that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions."26 Moreover, the Court "assume[d] that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition. '27 Although Nancy could not exercise her own rights
because she was not competent, another person could exercise
her rights on her behalf. The Court reasoned, however, that
determining that Nancy has a liberty interest in refusing lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition did not end the inquiry. The Court
then balanced the state interests against Nancy's liberty inter-
ests,2 s and held that Missouri constitutionally could require prov-
ing the incompetent person's wishes by clear and convincing
evidence in light of the significant state interests. 29
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion to emphasize
his belief that the Supreme Court should not delve into the field
of determining when life ends.3 ° Foreshadowing the Court's
analysis in Washington v. Glucksberg,3' Scalia wrote that "[i] t is at
least true that no 'substantive due process' claim can be main-
tained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has
deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected
against state interference. That cannot possibly be established
here. 32 According to Justice Scalia, the history and tradition of
our nation grounds the substantive due process analysis of
whether a liberty interest exists. Moreover, Justice Scalia noted
that the right to suicide is not rooted in the history and tradition
of our nation.33 However, the Court in Cruzan set the stage for a
right to physician-assisted suicide claim by implicitly holding that
a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment.
C. Casey
Two years after the Court decided Cruzan, the court faced
another decisional privacy issue. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 4
26. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
27. Id. at 279.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 284.
30. Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
32. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
33. See id. at 295.
34. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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abortion clinics and physicians challenged the constitutionality
of five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989."5 The clinics and physicians
argued that the act violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the provisions were undue burdens
on a woman's right to decide to terminate a pregnancy,36 a right
the Supreme Court held existed in Roe v. Wade."
The district court held a three-day bench trial to determine
whether the Pennsylvania provisions were unconstitutional. The
district court held that all of the provisions were unconstitutional
and issued an injunction against Pennsylvania enforcing the pro-
visions.3" The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part, holding that all of the provisions
except for the husband notification requirement were constitu-
tional. 39 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.4"
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter authored a joint
opinion for the Supreme Court, in which Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined in several parts. The joint opinion first reaffirmed
the Court's decision in Roe that a woman has a right to decide to
terminate a pregnancy prior to the time of fetal viability.41 The
joint opinion relied heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis
here.42 However, the joint opinion, which carried five votes for
this reasoning, also relied on the mystery passage, which is dis-
cussed below. The joint opinion then turned to the five provi-
sions in the Pennsylvania law individually. The joint opinion
concluded that none of the provisions, besides the spousal notifi-
cation provision, imposed an undue burden to a woman's right
to terminate a pregnancy.43 Thus, although a woman has a lib-
erty interest in terminating a pregnancy, states can impose cer-
tain restraints on such an act. Even though it may be an intimate
35. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3203-3220 (1990). The statute required the
following:
(1) that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior
to the operation; (2) that a woman seeking an abortion be provided
with information about abortions twenty-four hours in advance of the
operation; (3) that a married woman notify her husband of her
decision to have an abortion; (4) that a minor inform at least one
parent or obtain court approval.
36. 505 U.S. at 844-45.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1396-97 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
39. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991).
40. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 502 U.S. 1056 (1992).
41. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
42. See id. at 861.
43. See id. at 879-901.
1998]
574 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
and personal choice, central to personal dignity and autonomy,
states nevertheless can impose guidelines on terminating a
pregnancy.
In its reasoning, the joint opinion noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects from federal interference more liberty
interests than the first eight amendments to the Constitution
name or courts have previously declared.44 The joint opinion
stated "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which
the Fourteenth Amendment protects."45 For example, although
the Constitution does not provide explicitly for a liberty interest
in a married couple choosing to use contraception within the
confines of their home, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects such an interest.4 6
The joint opinion in Casey recognized that the test for
whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a liberty interest is
not simply whether that interest appears in the Constitution.
Five Justices voted for the section in the Casey opinion that noted:
"[t]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Con-
stitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasoned judgment."4 7 In this way, the
joint opinion argued that reasoned judgment should be the scale
used to determine whether a liberty interest exists.
The joint opinion used the reasoned judgment scale when
weighing the issue in Casey. The opinion stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education ...
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exist-
ence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.4 8
44. See id. at 847-48.
45. Id. at 848.
46. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
48. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
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This quotation-which I call the mystery passage-is crucial.
According to the joint opinion, the liberty that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects involves such matters as marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and edu-
cation. One characteristic that the matters listed share is that
they all involve "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy." This characteristic tips the reasoned judgment scale
in favor of recognizing a liberty interest.
Justice Scalia criticized the joint opinion's reasoned judg-
ment scale. Scalia noted that the authors of the joint opinion
never claimed that the decision in Roe would support the rea-
soned judgment scale; rather, the authors retreated to the doc-
trine of stare decisis.4 0 Scalia went on to comment:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced
Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact that ... the best
the Court can do to explain how it is that the word "liberty"
must be thought to include the right to destroy human
fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
choice.... But it is obvious to anyone applying "reasoned
judgment" that the same adjectives can be applied to many
forms of conduct that this Court... has held are not enti-
tled to constitutional protection-because, like abortion,
they are forms of conduct that have long been criminalized
in American society.50
To Justice Scalia, the reasoned judgment scale, which the phrase
"most intimate and personal choices" further clarifies, does not
yield an intelligible rule. The reasoned judgment scale faces the
same practical difficulties that the living constitution theory
encounters: how do we consistently decipher which liberty inter-
ests are imbedded in the Constitution? We cannot look to his-
tory because, as Justice Scalia noted, some forms of conduct to
which the mystery passage would apply have long been criminal-
ized in American society. Justice Scalia concluded, "[i]t is not
reasoned judgment that supports the Court's decision; only per-
sonal predilection."'" If we do not find the scale in the Constitu-
tion itself, according to Justice Scalia, only personal preferences
can shape the scale.
49. See id. at 982-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 983-84 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 984.
19981
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Justice Scalia, however, overvalued the weight of stare decisis
in the joint opinion's reasoning. The joint opinion relied on
both stare decisis and the reasoned judgment scale to arrive at its
decision. The joint opinion did not state that stare decisis was
the sole basis for reaffirming the Court's holding in Roe. More-
over, the joint opinion's reasoning that included the mystery pas-
sage arrived at the same conclusion: reaffirming the Court's
decision in Roe. Absent evidence to the contrary, the argumenta-
tion that included the mystery passage must be part of the
Court's ratio decidendi.
Notwithstanding the problems that the reasoned judgment
scale and the mystery passage face, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect-and the joint opinion does not argue that it
does-every intimate and personal choice, and every choice cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy. If the Fourteenth
Amendment did that, a contradiction would arise. Consider a
person who defines his existence by screaming "Fire!" in a
crowded theater when there is not a fire. Presumably, this per-
son's decision to scream "Fire!" is the most intimate and personal
choice he will make, and a choice central to his dignity and
autonomy. However, the Fourteenth Amendment surely fails to
protect such a liberty interest, if a liberty interest indeed exists
here. Therefore, merely because a choice is the most intimate
and personal choice a person may make in a lifetime, and a
choice central to personal dignity and autonomy, does not mean
necessarily that the choice is a liberty interest that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects.
The Fourteenth Amendment also does not protect every
intimate and personal choice for self-regarding conduct. For
example, a person cannot smoke marijuana in her own home.
She may define her existence by smoking marijuana. However,
although she may be alone and is in danger of hurting only her-
self, the law does not permit her to smoke marijuana. The Four-
teenth Amendment does not shield the individual, even if she
will only affect herself, in all intimate and personal choices.
The joint opinion, however, confined the analysis of the
issue to whether a liberty interest exists to terminate a pregnancy
and, if so, what limits states can impose on it. The joint opinion
did not consider the liberty interests of the person who screams
"Fire!" in a crowded theater or of the person who smokes mari-
juana in her own home. In the paragraph following the mystery
passage, the joint opinion distinguished abortion from choices
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing and education. That is, the joint opinion dis-
tinguished those choices traditionally recognized as carrying
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Fourteenth Amendment protection. The joint opinion also dis-
tinguished abortion from all other choices. The joint opinion
stated "[a]bortion is a unique act."52
The joint opinion's declaration here is important because it
offers a rational basis to limit the mystery passage in the joint
opinion's preceding paragraph. As we will see, reading the mys-
tery passage broadly leads down a slippery slope to conclusions
that are absurd. Someone could argue, as Judge Reinhardt did
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington,3 that deciding to hasten
one's own death is as intimate and personal a choice as is the
decision to terminate a pregnancy.54 The joint opinion, how-
ever, stated that abortion is a unique act. To argue that the Con-
stitution also protects other choices, e.g., the choice to hasten
one's own death, as liberty interests, is fallacious. Thejoint opin-
ion qualified the mystery passage by clearly stating that abortion
is a unique act. Abortion is unique in the sense that other
choices cannot justly be compared to it. Therefore, the mystery
passage should only apply to the unique act, i.e., abortion.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that abortion
is different from other liberty interests. He wrote that "[u] nlike
marriage, procreation, and contraception, abortion 'involves the
purposeful termination of a potential life.' The abortion deci-
sion must therefore 'be recognized as sui generis, different in kind
from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric of
personal or family privacy and autonomy.' ,,55 When we turn to
physician assisted suicide, the question becomes whether an
interest in physician assisted suicide is significantly different from
choices that the Court has recognized as liberty interests in the
past. Is physician assisted suicide also unique? If the decision in
Casey is to ground the constitutionality of a liberty interest in has-
tening one's death, the argument for a liberty interest in physi-
cian assisted suicide must be substantially similar to the argument
for a liberty interest in abortion.
D. Bowers
The Supreme Court has not found a liberty interest in every
personal choice. In Bowers v. Hardwick,56 Michael Hardwick, a
52. Id. at 852.
53. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
54. See id. at 800-02.
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325
(1980); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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homosexual, challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia stat-
ute that criminalized consensual sodomy.5 7 The police charged
Hardwick with committing sodomy with another adult male in
the bedroom of Hardwick's own home.5' The district court
granted the Attorney General of Georgia's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.59
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 6o It
held that the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protected private and intimate asso-
ciation and that such associations were beyond the reach of state
regulation.61 When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice
White, delivering the majority opinion, framed the issue nar-
rowly: " [t] he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy ... "62 The Court held that the Constitution confers no
liberty interest to engage in homosexual sodomy, even in the pri-
vacy of one's own home. 3
The Court would not infer a liberty interest in homosexual
activity from prior Court decisions.64 One reason the Court
could not infer a liberty interest is because of how narrowly the
Court framed the issue. Jed Rubenfeld argued that "[s] o stated,
the issue was for the majority literally a foregone conclusion. 65
Although the Court has traditionally found a liberty interest in
matters dealing with the family, marriage and procreation,66 the
Court stated that there was "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activ-
ity on the other .... 67 Thus, the Court would not expand the
set of liberty interests which the Fourteenth Amendment protects
to include consensual sodomy in the privacy of one's own home.
57. The Georgia statue provided, in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another ....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years....
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984).
58. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
59. See id. at 188.
60. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
61. See id. at 1212-13.
62. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
63. See id. at 195-96.
64. See id. at 190.
65. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 747 (1989).
66. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
67. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
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An underlying theme in Justice White's opinion was the
notion of judicial legitimacy. The Court was unwilling to protect
rights that the Constitution does not enumerate. The Court
opined that "[t]he case also calls for some judgment about the
limits of the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional man-
date."6 Furthermore, the opinion stated:
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text
involves much more than the imposition of the Justices'
own choice of values on the States and the Federal Govern-
ment, the Court has sought to identify the nature of the
rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.6"
The Court was reluctant to establish a liberty interest in consen-
sual sodomy for fear of undermining judicial legitimacy.
The decision in Bowers also supports refusing to expand the
set of liberty interests to include physician assisted suicide. One
could argue that physician assisted suicide can be inferred from
decisions, such as Cruzan and Casey, which dealt with refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment and terminating a pregnancy.
However, the decision in Bowers sets a precedent of refusing to
expand the set of liberty interests because of a claimed right's
similarity with previously recognized rights. Even if physician
assisted suicide is similar to refusing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, a more substantial argument is necessary to support recog-
nizing physician assisted suicide as a liberty interest. There is a
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and physician assisted suicide on the other. However, as
the decision in Bowers indicates, that connection does not mean
necessarily that hastening one's death is a liberty interest.
E. Compassion in Dying I, I & III
Two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Casey, a case
began in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington that threatened to expand the doctrine of deci-
sional privacy even further. In Roe, Cruzan and Casey, the Court
reaffirmed its expansive reading of the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, in light of the mystery passage in Casey, people argued
that physician assisted suicide was also a liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that choosing sui-
cide for a terminally-ill patient is as monumental a decision as
terminating a pregnancy or removing life-sustaining medical
68. Id.
69. Id. at 191.
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treatment. In this context, a challenge to a law that prohibited
physician assisted suicide was inevitable.
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,7 ° terminally ill patients,
physicians and a nonprofit organization sought to have declared
unconstitutional a Washington law criminalizing physician
assisted suicide. The Washington statute provided in pertinent
part: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."7 1
The central issue in Compassion in Dyingwas whether a terminally
ill person had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in has-
tening the person's own death. If such a liberty interest existed,
the succeeding question was whether prohibiting a physician
from aiding the terminally ill person to exercise that right vio-
lated the person's due process rights.
In the district court, District Judge Rothstein held that the
Washington statute was unconstitutional.7 2 Judge Rothstein first
reasoned that the statute violated a liberty interest that the Four-
teenth Amendment guaranteed. Judge Rothstein noted the
"long line of cases" where the Supreme Court has protected
choices "relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing and education ... ."" Judge Roth-
stein then quoted the mystery passage from Casey. Judge Roth-
stein acknowledged that the Supreme Court wrote the mystery
passage in a different context from this case's facts. However,
Judge Rothstein found "the reasoning in Casey highly instructive
and almost prescriptive. ' 74 Judge Rothstein held that like termi-
nating a pregnancy, hastening one's death is an intimate and
personal choice. Moreover, Judge Rothstein concluded that
since hastening one's death is an intimate and personal choice,
in light of the mystery passage, it must be a liberty interest.75
When the Ninth Circuit first heard the case, Judge Noonan
authored the opinion for the majority of the three judge panel.
The court reversed the district court's holding that the decision
to hasten one's own death is a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
70. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060. (West 1988).
72. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467
(W.D. Wash. 1994).
73. Id. at 1459.
74. Id.
75. Judge Rothstein then evaluated whether the Washington statute
provided an undue burden, and held that it did. See id. at 1464-66. Buttressing
her argument, Judge Rothstein also held that the Washington statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 1466-67.
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Amendment.76 Judge Noonan first argued that the mystery pas-
sage should not be taken out of context. He criticized Judge
Rothstein's reasoning that the mystery passage was "almost
prescriptive."77
Judge Noonan argued that reading the mystery passage
broadly leads to a conclusion that is a "reductio ad absurdum."78
He wrote:
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to
act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide
and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of
at least every sane adult. The attempt to restrict such rights
to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exits in this
context, as Casey asserted in the context of reproductive
rights, every man and woman in the United States must
enjoy it. 79
According to Judge Noonan, applying the mystery passage in the
context of physician assisted suicide leads to absurd results. If we
applied it and read it broadly, the mystery passage would permit
physician assisted suicide for every sane adult. Permitting physi-
cian assisted suicide for every sane adult is the absurd conclusion
that Judge Noonan argued disproves the hypothesis that judges
should read the mystery passage broadly and apply it in the con-
text of physician assisted suicide.
Judge Noonan also argued that the district court's decision
lacked foundation not only in legal precedent, but also in the
traditions of our nation. Judge Noonan went so far as to write
that inventing a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide
is "antithetical to the defense of human life that has been a chief
responsibility of our constitutional government."8 ° Moreover,
Washington had many significant interests supporting the consti-
tutionality of its statute.
81
Judge Reinhardt, who authored the majority opinion over-
turning the panel decision in Compassion in Dying, first noted the
broad approach by which he would address the issue. Judge
Reinhardt remarked that Judge Noonan "defined the claimed
liberty interest as a 'constitutional right to aid in killing one-
76. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir.
1995).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 591.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 592-93.
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self."'' 2 Judge Reinhardt's opinion argued that such a narrow
approach was not appropriate because this narrow interest could
not exist without a broader interest. One cannot have a constitu-
tional right to aid in killing oneself without having a constitu-
tional right to hasten the person's own death. Therefore, Judge
Reinhardt first tackled the broader issue of whether a person has
a liberty interest in hastening the person's own death.
Judge Reinhardt summarized his approach to deciding the
case when he wrote: "it is the end and not the means that defines
the liberty interest.""3 Judge Reinhardt argued that the court
should determine two issues in succession. First, the court
should determine whether there is a liberty interest in hastening
one's own death. Only after the court has determined that issue
should the court determine whether prohibiting a physician
from assisting the terminally ill person to exercise that liberty
interest violates the Due Process Clause. The first issue is broad
in scope, and the second issue is narrow.
Judge Reinhardt made a fallacious jump when he applied
the Supreme Court's decision in Casey to the Compassion in Dying
case. He stretched to extreme the mystery passage. Judge Rein-
hardt argued that because the decision to hasten one's own
death is an intimate and personal choice, it is therefore a liberty
interest.84 He wrote:
Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion,
the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most inti-
mate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and
autonomy.' . . . How a person dies not only determines the
nature of the final period of his existence, but in many
cases, the enduring memories held by those who love
him.8 5
Judge Reinhardt likened the decision to have an abortion to the
decision to hasten one's own death on the grounds that they are
both personal and intimate choices, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy; and on this point, Judge Reinhardt is
correct.
82. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 815-16. Reinhardt used the mystery passage from Casey:
"'These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' Id. at 813
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
85. Id. at 813-14.
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Judge Reinhardt's analysis, however, is flawed because he
used the wording of the mystery passage out of its context to
determine that a liberty interest existed in hastening one's own
death. According to the joint opinion in Casey, one theme that
all the liberty interests which were listed shared was that they all
were "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy."
It does not follow, however, that because a choice is intimate and
personal, and central to personal dignity and autonomy, that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects it as a liberty interest. This
does not follow even according to the reasoned judgment scale.
A choice that is intimate and personal, central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, without more, merely shares common char-
acteristics with liberty interests, such as decisions dealing with
child rearing, education, marriage, procreation, and abortion. If
something shares characteristics with a member of a certain
group, it does not mean necessarily that the thing is indeed a
member of that group. Therefore, if hastening one's death
shares characteristics with terminating a pregnancy, which is a
liberty interest, it does not mean necessarily that hastening one's
death is a liberty interest.
The mystery passage was one component in the Casey deci-
sion. Another important component, as explained above, was
the weight of the doctrine of stare decisis. The mystery passage
alone did not carry the Casey decision. To liken hastening one's
death to terminating a pregnancy does not carry enough force to
establish physician assisted suicide as a liberty interest. Compara-
tively, the weight of the mystery passage played a much larger
role in Judge Reinhardt's decision than in the decision in Casey.
F. Glucksberg
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg8 6 seized the
opportunity to clarify the Court's substantive due process analy-
sis. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court,
began the opinion by defining the issue in the case: whether the
Washington statute's prohibition against causing or aiding a sui-
cide offended the Fourteenth Amendment.87 The Court held
that the Washington statute did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, and overruled the Ninth Circuit's en banc
decision.88
86. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
87. See id. at 2261.
88. See id. at 2275.
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The Court clarified that its method of substantive due pro-
cess analysis has two components. First, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects fundamental rights and liberties that are "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed."'' 9 Second, the Court
requires a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interests. 90 In working through this analysis, the Court empha-
sized the importance of the history and traditions of our nation.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[o]ur Nation's his-
tory, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial
'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,' that direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause."9 1 Further-
more, the lack of acceptance for suicide or assisted suicide
throughout history seemed to influence Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter also expounded on
the Court's substantive due process analysis. Justice Souter wrote
that "the process of substantive review by reasoned judg-
ment . . . is one of close criticism going to the details of the
opposing interests and to their relationships with the historically
recognized principles that lend .them weight or value."9 2 This
"reasoned judgment" language underscored Justice Souter's sub-
stantive due process analysis in his concurrence. Furthermore,
the reasoned judgment language echoed the reasoned judgment
language of the joint opinion that received five votes in Casey.
Although the reasoned judgment language powers Justice Sou-
ter's concurring opinion, he nonetheless recognized the impor-
tance of history in substantive due process analysis.
The first section of the Court's opinion explored the history
of suicide and assisted suicide. The Court noted that assisting a
suicide is a crime in almost every state.9" Moreover, "for over 700
years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished
or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide."94
Although Americans eventually abolished harsh common law
penalties for committing suicide, state legislatures and courts
89. Id. at 2268 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 502, 503 (1977);
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
90. See id.
91. Id. (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
92. Id. at 2284 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
93. See id. at 2263.
94. Id.
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have continued to prohibit assisting suicides. ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist ended the first section of the opinion by marking our
nation's conviction against assisted suicide:
Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton,
but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue
to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical
technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on
the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not
retreated from this prohibition.95
In light of this, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that assistance
in committing suicide did not have a place in our nation's
history.96
Although it may not be imbedded in our nation's history
and tradition, the physicians challenging the law argued that
physician assisted suicide is consistent with the Court's substan-
tive due process line of cases. For example, the doctors argued
that in Cruzan the Court "acknowledged that competent, dying
persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining
medical treatment and thus hasten death."97 ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist countered, however, that there was more to the decision in
Cruzan than abstract concepts of personal autonomy. The his-
tory and traditions of our nation always have protected the right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.9" According to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court's decision in Cruzan flowed from
this type of reasoning, rather than mere abstract concepts of per-
sonal autonomy.
The doctors also relied on the mystery passage in Casey.
Chief Justice Rehnquist clarified the meaning of the mystery pas-
sage in this respect:
By choosing [the mystery passage] language, the Court's
opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of
our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that
this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history
and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of consti-
tutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the
recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of
conscience and belief about ultimate considerations to the
observation that 'though the abortion decision may origi-
95. Id. at 2267.
96. See id. at 2269.
97. Brief of Respondents at 23, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (citing Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)).
98. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
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nate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more
than a philosophic exercise.' That many of the rights and lib-
erties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in per-
sonal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion
that any and all important, intimate, and personal deci-
sions are so protected, and Casey does not suggest
otherwise.
99
Glucksberg directed courts to interpret the mystery passage in con-
junction with the Supreme Court's previous decisions and the
history and tradition of our nation. Courts should not remove
the mystery passage from its context, or extend the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect any and all
important, intimate and personal decisions.
Aside from the arguments concerning the effect of prior
substantive due process cases on physician assisted suicide, one
amicus brief argued that the Court would be imposing its own
values on terminally-ill patients if it denied the right to physician
assisted suicide. It stated:
Denying that opportunity to terminally-ill patients who are
in agonizing pain or otherwise doomed to an existence
they regard as intolerable could only be justified on the
basis of a religious or ethical conviction about the value or
meaning of life itself. Our Constitution forbids govern-
ment to impose such convictions on its citizens.1 00
The brief argued that a state cannot totally prohibit abortion
because that would "impose one conception of the meaning and
value of human existence on all individuals."10 1 Furthermore,
the philosophers argued, the mystery passage reflects an idea
underlying many of the liberty interests that our Constitution
protects. 10 2 The philosophers argued that the Court should find
a liberty interest in physician assisted suicide, which could not be
overridden by the states.
The philosophers' brief failed to recognize that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects only certain
liberty interests. For this protection, liberty interests must be
part of our nation's history and traditions. As articulated by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, suicide is not imbedded in our nation's
99. Id. at 2271 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973))
(footnote omitted).
100. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in support of
Respondents, 1996 WL 708956, at *3, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
101. Id. at *8.
102. See id. at *5-5.
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history and tradition. Therefore, state governments can legislate
constitutionally on the issue of physician assisted suicide, and can
impose their values regarding physician assisted suicide through
acting upon their state interests.
Justice Souter argued in his concurring opinion that the
Washington statute is constitutional and that the Court should
reject finding a liberty interest in hastening one's death.103 One
reason Justice Souter offered was the weight of the slippery slope
argument. He wrote:
The case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not
because recognizing one due process right would leave a
court with no principled basis to avoid recognizing
another, but because there is a plausible case that the right
claimed would not be readily containable by reference to
facts about the mind that are matters of difficultjudgment,
or by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation, noble or
not.
104
Justice Souter argued that finding a liberty interest in hastening
one's own death, and assistance in doing so, cannot withstand
practical challenges. Too large a danger exists, according to Jus-
tice Souter.
Justice O'Connor emphasized similar concerns in her con-
currence. Justice O'Connor argued that even if a liberty interest
in hastening one's death exists, the state's interests sufficiently
justify a prohibition against physician assisted suicide.105 The
states have an important and legitimate interest in protecting
life, and may protect people who are not truly competent or fac-
ing imminent death from physician assisted suicide. States also
have an interest in protecting people from physician assisted sui-
cide whose decision is not truly voluntary. These concerns led
Justice O'Connor to assert that even if there was a liberty interest
in hastening one's death, Washington constitutionally could pro-
hibit physician assisted suicide.
The Supreme Court in Glucksberg clarified two important
points. First, the Court stressed the importance of the history
and traditions of our nation in substantive due process analysis.
Second, the Court explained that courts should interpret the
mystery passage in light of the entire opinion in Casey.
Extracting the mystery passage from its context in Casey can lead
103. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
104. Id. at 2291.
105. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to inappropriate results. Thus, according to the Court, all impor-
tant, intimate and personal choices are not liberty interests.
III. LIMITED UNIvERsALISM: AN ETHICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST
READING THE MYSTERY PASSAGE BROADLY
1 0 6
The Supreme Court should read the mystery passage nar-
rowly not only because reading it broadly does not comport with
Court precedent, but also because reading it broadly does not
comport with a basic philosophical system. To illuminate this
point, this section defends limited universalism, a claim that
some universal standards exist but they_ do not constitute one's
morality in its entirety. This section argues that a supercode of
core moral standards, i.e., morality in the narrow sense, found in
every moral culture grounds judgments about the wrongness of
actions. Furthermore, this section argues that cultures define
the core moral standards differently and assign them different
weights, creating various moral systems (i.e., morality in the
broad sense). Although they agree with morality in the narrow
sense, the resulting moral systems vary widely. Finally, this sec-
tion argues that the mystery passage is a manifestation of
assigning different weights to core moral standards. In this light,
we can examine the ethical dimensions of the mystery passage.
Tom Beauchamp argues that there is morality in the narrow
sense. He wrote, "a body of general ethical precepts constitutes
morality wherever it is found. I will call this shared, universal
system of beliefs 'morality in the narrow sense."' 107 According to
Beauchamp, we can find certain core standards in every culture.
This set of core moral standards constitutes a supercode that is
universally applicable to all cultures. If this is so, a single moral-
ity exists that is pervasive in all cultures. Therefore, not con-
forming to morality in the narrow sense is being immoral or
amoral, rather than following a different morality. As we discov-
ered the nature of human beings, we must have discovered
morality in the narrow sense because one set of core moral stan-
dards exists for all cultures.
Consequential argumentation justifies the existence of
morality in the narrow sense. There are certain standards that
humans must follow or they could not operate together in a soci-
ety. Logically, this holds through time and across cultural
boundaries. Marcus Singer argues, "[i]f the consequences of
106. Much of the material in this section comes from a thesis written by
the author at Georgetown University in May 1995.
107. ToM L. BatUcHAv, COMPARATVWE STUDIES: JAPAN AND AMERICA 1
(1995).
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everyone's doing some action x would be undesirable, then no
one ought to do x' 1 8 without a reason. For example, a core stan-
dard is do not kill. The consequences of everybody feeling free
to commit murder would cripple, if not destroy, a society. There-
fore, in order for a society to continue, the society must have a
core moral standard of do not kill. Thus, there are core moral
standards, for if none existed, societies could not operate. More-
over, these core moral standards are the same for every culture
because at the most fundamental level each culture must deal
with similar questions of civility.
This argument does not necessitate, however, that every
domain-specific moral standard be universal; the argument per-
mits different interpretations of morality in the narrow sense.
Beauchamp wrote, "[d]espite the nonrelativity of norms of
morality in the narrow sense, a relativity or pluralism ofjudgments
and practices is an inevitable outcome of moral decisionmaking
and historical development in cultures." '' 9 These judgments
and practices constitute morality in the broad sense. For exam-
ple, cultures interpret the core moral standard do not kill differ-
enfly. Although the standards may differ, cultures must have a
moral system (in the broad sense) with standards about killing.
Furthermore, because of the "relativity or pluralism of judgments
and practices," cultures create different moralities. In sum, there
is one morality in the narrow sense, and consequentialism proves
its existence. However, there are many moralities in the broad
sense. Moreover, due to the relativity and pluralism of judg-
ments and practices, each society creates moralities in the broad
sense.
This account of morality in the narrow and broad senses is
similar to Michael Philips' core moral standards, domain-specific
standards and group-related standards." 0 I argue that the core
moral standards are the standards of morality in the narrow
sense, i.e., those standards that all societies have. As Philips
does," 1 I argue that these core moral standards are domain sen-
sitive, changing in weight according to different domains or cul-
tures. Furthermore, domain-specific standards and group-
related standards constitute morality in the broad sense, allowing
for variance between cultures. However, I argue that the core
108. MARcus GEORGE SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN THE
LOGIC OF ETHICS WITH THE RUDIMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 66
(1961).
109. BEAUCHAIP, supra note 107, at 4.
110. See MICHAEL PHILIPS, BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND SKEPTICISM: ETHICS
AS A SOCIAL ARTIFACT 89-95 (1994).
111. See id. at 7.
19981
590 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
moral standards are pervasive, contrary to Philips'
argumentation.
I agree with Philips that the constancy assumption is an illu-
sion. Philips wrote:
A good many discussions in ethics and applied ethics pre-
suppose that moral standards have constant weights or
rankings across contexts. .... the constancy assumption
holds that if a moral standard has a weight of a given mag-
nitude in a given case, it has a weight of that magnitude in
every case. ... [Ethics as a Social Artifact] maintains that
constancy is an illusion.11 2
Although a moral standard has a certain weight in one culture, it
does not have necessarily the same weight in every culture. Each
culture creates its own morality in the broad sense, interpreting
the core moral standards and assigning them weights differently.
In this way, both Philips' theory and my theory preserve the rich
diversity among the different cultures.
Although my construction of moral philosophy is similar to
Philips', we disagree on one fundamental issue: Philips thinks
there are conditions for or types of core moral standards, though
there are no shared standards themselves.' 13 I, however, argue
that there are core moral standards, though they are abstract.
Philips might agree that core moral standards could be abstract,
but then argue that they would be so abstract as to be
meaningless.
Philips argued that it is not valid to generalize standards to
core moral standards, and thus he only explicated the conditions
for or types of core moral standards. Philips wrote that "both
[core standards'] importance and, in some cases our criteria for
applying them vary from domain to domain .... For these rea-
sons it is, strictly speaking, misleading to speak of the prohibition
against lying (stealing, killing, etc.).""4 Speaking of the prohibi-
tion against lying is a method of understanding the underlying
theme that pervades all cultures. It is speaking of a core moral
standard that comes to fruition in different domains in different
ways. For example, a Japanese person might find it moral to lie
to protect the reputation of his or her company, whereas in a
similar instance an American might find it moral to tell all the
facts. Both cultures, however, do have a general moral standard
"do not lie." The variance in the exact domain-specific standard
about the prohibition of lying among different domains does not
112. Id. at 100.
113. See id. at 95.
114. Id.
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negate the validity of the core standard's consistency in morality
in the narrow sense. Rather, the variance supports the pluralism
of judgments and practices among different domains about the
core moral standards.
Philips goes on to write that "these activities are regulated
differently in different domains and for good reasons. Strictly
speaking, then, there is no perfectly general standard 'don't
lie.'"115 To Philips, there is no perfectly general standard for two
reasons: first, because core standards vary in importance; and sec-
ond, because the criteria for applying them vary from domain to
domain. These two reasons do not explain why it is invalid to
generalize certain standards present in all domains as core moral
standards. Although manifestations of core moral standards do
vary in some respects, similarities nevertheless exist, e.g., "do not
deceive." The fact that different domains regulate the wrongness
of deceiving someone does not negate the similarity in the moral
standard, "do not deceive," found in moral cultures. Philips'
claims, in this respect, should only note that generalizing to the
core moral standard is extremely difficult, which I grant; but it is
possible. In sum, Philips does not discount the similarities in
core moral standards among cultures; rather he merely marks
how they vary. Thus, the burden to show that we cannot genera-
lize to core moral standards is still on Philips.
Philips seems to think that if he resorts to naming some core
moral standards, he must accept a universalistic attitude similar
to Bernard Gert's. I disagree. I do not think that if I claim there
are one, two, or several universal moral standards that I must
therefore accept that there is one complete set of moral stan-
dards like Gert's ten-moral rules that is universally applicable." 6
However, although he offered no argumentation for it, Philips
thinks that I must. This is the distinction between my account of
morality and Philips': mine is one of limited universalism and his
is between universalism and skepticism. The distinction is slight,
but vitally important because one names core moral standards
and one does not, respectively.
Bernard Gert argues that he has generalized all of the uni-
versally applicable moral rules, which he called his ten-moral-
rules. Although I will not argue for this type of universalism, I do
think that Gert's first eight rules are a solid beginning for nam-
ing some core moral standards. The first eight are:
1. Don't kill.
115. Id.
116. See BERNARD GERT, MORALITY. A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL
RULES (1988).
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2. Don't cause pain.
3. Don't disable.
4. Don't deprive of freedom.
5. Don't deprive of pleasure
6. Don't deceive.
7. Keep your promise.
8. Don't cheat."
l 7
Gert believes that the above list, along with his ninth and tenth
rules, comprise a list of all the rules which moral persons must
follow. I, however, argue that this list is incomplete, and no rule
on the list is absolute. We may want to add another core moral
standard, for example, that Beauchamp noted: "[p]rotect and
defend the rights of others."1 "8 Moreover, one rule can override
another rule in a certain situation. Morality in the broad sense
constitutes the system in which society assigns weights to the dif-
ferent rules. This system governs whether one rule can override
another. The justification that Gert offered for these ten rules is
that all moral persons would follow them unless an impartial
rational person would advocate differently, i.e., unless there is a
justifiable reason to infringe a rule. Gert called this the "moral
attitude." 19
I concur with Philips' claim that Gert's ten-moral-rules analy-
sis underestimates the complexity of moral thinking. 2 ° How-
ever, I do think that Gert's justification, though simple, is
sufficient for the first eight rules to be core moral standards.
Because a core moral standard is a standard for all domains, and
because all moral persons would follow Gert's first eight rules
unless an impartial rational person would advocate differently,
the first eight rules are examples of core moral standards.
Because there are core standards, i.e., morality in the narrow
sense, that are consistent through time and across cultures, we
can evaluate the wrongness of an action according to those stan-
dards. However, in assessing the wrongness of an action, we must
understand the distinction between infringing a core moral stan-
dard and violating one. When an agent infringes a core moral
standard, the agent acts contrary to it and has ajustifiable reason
for doing so. When an agent violates one, the agent does not
have thatjustifiable reason. For example, if I kill an assassin who
is trying to kill me, I infringe the core moral standard, "do not
kill." Because not killing an assassin would probably result in the
117. See id. at 157.
118. BFAucHAMp, supra note 107, at 3.
119. See GERT, supra note 116, at 96-124.
120. See PHILIPS, supra note 110, at 119-20.
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destruction of all my freedom, namely my freedom to live, and
because I assign more importance to this than killing someone
who in fact is threatening my life, I can morally kill the assassin
without violating a core moral standard. However, I do infringe
one. In contrast, the atrocious medical treatments conducted by
the Nazi Germans present a clear violation. Defensible justifica-
tion for those actions is absolutely impossible. A moral agent can
never violate a core moral standard regardless of the domain-
specific standards involved, but can infringe it.
The method of reflective equilibrium, a concept that John
Rawls developed,121 justifies an agent's moral standards. Thisjus-
tification is pivotal because often agents blindly believe in their
moral structure, which sometimes has a critical error. Moreover,
if an agent does not have practical justification by means of
reflective equilibrium, and although in accordance with the
agent's moral system, the agent performs a morally wrong act,
the agent is culpably ignorant.
What is reflective equilibrium? Daniel Little said that it is
"the idea that moral theories are justified through a process of
deliberation in which we consider a wide range of beliefs and
judgments as a system, and evaluate competing moral theories in
terms of their coherence with this system."1 22 Roger Ebertz
argued that reflective equilibrium is "the state of one's
beliefs . . .when 'principles and judgments coincide.' When a
person's beliefs are in reflective equilibrium, the structure of
those beliefs, from the particular to the most general, cohere."
1 23
Simply, reflective equilibrium is a method to determine if one's
moral structure is coherent.
Little went on to argue that Rawls' argumentation for reflec-
tive equilibrium is weak because "it depends heavily on the sub-
stantive moral presuppositions with which one begins.'
'1 24 I
argue, however, that because the supercode exists, we all share a
common starting point, namely the core moral standards.
Because of the inevitable pluralism of judgments and practices,
however, we arrive at different moral theories, i.e., moralities in
the broad sense. Through reflective equilibrium, an agent can
see-and is obligated to know-if his or her moral structure is
congruent with the supercode. When assessing the culpability of
121. See generally JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
122. Daniel Little, Reflective Equilibrium and Justification, 22 S.J. PHIL. 373,
373 (1984).
123. Roger P. Ebertz, Is Reflective Equilibrium a Coherentist Model?, 23
CANADIAN J. PHIL. 194, 194 (1993).
124. Little, supra note 122, at 373.
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an agent, we must note whether the agent has partaken in the
method of reflective equilibrium.
How does my ethical system apply to the mystery passage?
Ronald Dworkin argued that there should be a "fusion of consti-
tutional law and moral theory."1 25 Robert Bork summarized
Dworkin's view of a judge's duties: "the judge is to determine the
principles that underlie and explain the nation's moral judg-
ments, and then apply those principles against any particular
moral judgment made by a legislature to decide whether the lat-
ter is consistent or aberrational."126 However, Dworkin did insist
on a constraint forjudges: integrity. 127 Regardless ofjudges' per-
sonal views of justice, judges must rule with integrity.
Dworkin outlined three principle dimensions of integrity.
Dworkin wrote:
First, [integrity in law] insists that judicial decision be a
matter of principle, not compromise or strategy or political
accommodation.... Second, as Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter emphasized in their Casey opinion, integ-
rity holds vertically: a judge who claims that a particular
liberty is fundamental must show that his claim is consis-
tent with principles embedded in Supreme Court prece-
dent and with the main structures of our constitutional
arrangement. Third, integrity holds horizontally: a judge
who adopts a principle in one case must give full weight to
it in other cases he decides or endorses, even in apparently
unrelated fields of law. 128
These three dimensions of integrity hold for all judicial opinions,
according to Dworkin. Dworkin realized that this would not
result necessarily in uniform judicial decisions. This integrity is
an ideal. Moreover, Dworkin argued that to force someone to
endure unbearable suffering is a form of tyranny if it is merely to
satisfy someone else's values. 129
How does my ethical theory fuse constitutional law and the
mystery passage? The mystery passage concerns our desire to
define our own existence free from government intrusion. In
general, this is an important value in our nation. However, we
have competing core moral standards when we apply the mystery
125. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977).
126. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 386
(1985).
127. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 146 (1993).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 217.
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passage to the issues surrounding physician assisted suicide. We
also have another core moral standard: do not kill. An ethically
sound interpretation of the mystery passage must balance
cogently these two moral standards.
Cultures could weight these competing moral standards dif-
ferently. To see how our culture, our nation, has weighted them
we can look to history. The Court did this in its decision in Gluck-
sberg and held that finding a liberty interest in hastening one's
own death is contrary to the history and traditions of our nation.
If physician assisted suicide is against the history and traditions of
our nation, it cannot agree with the ethical system of our coun-
try. A moral agent can see this through reflective equilibrium,
taking into account the history and traditions of our nation.
Many logical people argue that physician assisted suicide is
ethical and comports with legal precedent. For example, the
Court strongly suggested in Cruzan that a person has a liberty
interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. Here
again, we had to balance moral standards to form morality in the
broad sense. With the facts in Cruzan, the Supreme Court
weighted the moral standard of refusing medical treatment and
protecting bodily integrity more than the moral standard "do not
kill." The history and traditions of our nation tipped the scale in
favor of the moral standard of refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment and protecting bodily integrity. With the facts of phy-
sician assisted suicide, however, the Court should weight keeping
people alive more than total and absolute personal autonomy.
This is not to say that all cultures must come to the same conclu-
sion to be ethical. However, we, as members of our nation's cul-
ture, must conclude through reflective equilibrium that in light
of our nation's history and traditions, physician assisted suicide is
not ethical. Thus, the mystery passage, although it speaks ethi-
cally about many other circumstances, does not cover physician
assisted suicide.
IV. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: A PRAcTIcAL ARGUMENT AGAINST
READING THE MYSTERY PASSAGE BROADLY
In addition to legal precedent and philosophical argumenta-
tion, practical implications support reading the mystery passage
narrowly. Although the law has traditionally protected personal
decisions concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, etc.,
extending this protection to decisions to hasten one's own death
would lead to many untenable consequences. The decision to
hasten one's own death may be "the most intimate and personal
choice a person may make in a lifetime, a choice central to per-
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sonal dignity and autonomy." However, if courts recognize a lib-
erty interest for a terminally ill person to hasten the person's own
death, that right inevitably will extend to those who are not ter-
minally ill. John Arras argues that "the logic of the case for [phy-
sician assisted suicide], based as it is upon the twin pillars of
patient autonomy and mercy, makes it highly unlikely that soci-
ety could stop with this modest proposal once it had ventured
out on the slope."' Physician assisted suicide and euthanasia
will become practically indistinguishable, and patients will have
doctors legally kill them on demand. For reasons such as these,
the mystery passage from Casey should be read narrowly to pre-
vent sliding down the slippery slope.
Robert Sedler grounded the legality of physician assisted sui-
cide in the mystery passage from Casey. He wrote that "the right
to define one's own concept of existence and to make the most
basic decisions about bodily integrity surely must include the
right of terminally ill persons to make the choice whether to
hasten inevitable death or whether to go on living until death
comes naturally.' 131 However, why would this right not extend to
someone not terminally ill? If the terminally ill person has a
right to hasten the person's own death because one has a right to
define one's own concept of existence and to make the most
basic decisions about bodily integrity, then the healthy person
must have that right as well.'3 2 It follows that the healthy person
also has a right to hasten the person's own death. Grounding the
liberty interest with the precept that one has a right to define
one's own existence does not compel-or even suggest-who
may exercise that liberty interest. Moreover, following this rea-
soning, there is no basis for limiting the right of a terminally ill
person to hasten the person's own death to the late stages of the
illness. Even if the Court limited the right to those terminally ill,
there is nothing logically prohibiting a person exercising that
right when death is years or decades away. Therefore, reading
the mystery passage from Casey broadly will lead down the slip-
pery slope so that healthy people also have a right to hasten their
own death and terminally ill people can exercise the right too
quickly.
Confusion arises, though, even if we define "terminally ill"
and confine the liberty interest to those people in the late stages
130. John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, J. CONTEMP.
HFALTH L. & POL'Y 361, 369 (1997).
131. Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I
Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 725, 728 (1995).
132. See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72
U. DET. MERCY L.REv. 735, 73940 (1995).
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of their illness. Yale Kamisar noted that advocates for physician
assisted suicide often restrict classifying patients as "terminally ill"
to those experiencing severe pain and suffering.1"' Kamisar
argued, however, that if "suffering" includes psychological suffer-
ing and not merely physical pain, then clearly identifying the
"terminally ill" becomes more difficult.13 4 Does agonizing dur-
ing a difficult divorce constitute "suffering"? In the absence of
externally verifiable evidence of pain and suffering, ambiguity
inevitably will arise.
What about those that are physically unable to perform the
final act, e.g., people who cannot swallow the pills to bring about
death? Even if the law was able to classify adequately which ter-
minally ill people could exercise the right to hasten their own
death, it would discriminate against those terminally ill people
who could not physically perform the final act, unless the law
adopted active euthanasia. On the one hand, the law should not
determine whether one has the right to hasten one's own death
by determining whether one has the ability to swallow pills. If
there is a defensible liberty interest to define one's own exist-
ence, which includes a terminally ill person determining the time
and manner of the person's own death, one who is not physically
able to perform the final act should have that right to hasten
death as well. On the other hand, the Court should not recog-
nize a liberty interest in active euthanasia, which would logically
follow recognizing the liberty interest of a terminally ill person to
hasten the person's own death. Refusing to recognize a liberty
interest in hastening one's own death, i.e., reading the mystery
passage narrowly, solves this dilemma between advocating physi-
cian assisted suicide and opposing active euthanasia.
In light of this dilemma, some doctors who originally advo-
cated physician assisted suicide and opposed active euthanasia
have changed their position on active euthanasia. Kamisar noted
that in 1992, Dr. Timothy Quill and Dr. Diane Meier supported
physician assisted suicide, but "opposed legalizing any form of
active euthanasia 'because of the risk of abuse it presents.' "15
However, two years later Dr. Quill and Dr. Meier recanted their
position for an absolute ban on euthanasia.1 36 They now
acknowledge the injustice of denying an established right to
hasten one's own death to a person physically unable to swallow
133. See id. at 744.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 747 (quoting Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill-
Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380,
1381 (1992)).
136. See id. at 748.
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pills merely because of the physical disability. They wrote that
"ot] o confine legalized physician-assisted death to assisted suicide
unfairly discriminates against patients with unrelievable suffering
who resolve to end their lives but are physically unable to do
so. "1" Thus, Dr. Quill and Dr. Meier now advocate at least some
form of active euthanasia. This swift change evidences what
would happen if the Court recognized a right to hasten one's
own death. Euthanasia quickly follows physician assisted suicide.
If we legalize physician assisted suicide or euthanasia, physi-
cally healthy people will want eventually to exercise the right to
hasten their own death. The Netherlands in 1993 faced this diffi-
cult step in the Assen case." 8 In the Netherlands, "euthanasia
is . . . permitted when a doctor faces an unresolvable conflict
between the law, which makes euthanasia illegal, and his respon-
sibility to help a patient whose irremediable suffering makes
euthanasia necessary."" 9 In the Assen case, Dr. Boudewijn
Chabot treated a physically healthy fifty-year-old woman who
requested aid in hastening her own death. She had lost her two
sons and had divorced her husband. Chabot did not find her
clinically depressed or afflicted with psychiatric illness. Chabot
merely determined that she was suffering and wanted to die.' 4 °
Chabot gave her pills to hasten her death, and stayed with her
until her heart stopped. 4' After Chabot followed the normal
procedure for a physician assisted suicide of reporting an unnat-
ural death, the police investigated and charged him.'42 How-
ever, the court acquitted him, ruling that Chabot
was justified in his actions because his patient was compe-
tent to make the decision to die freely, her suffering was
irremediable, and the doctor met the Dutch criterion for
force majeure, meaning he was compelled by an overpower-
ing force to put the welfare of his patient above the law,
which formally prohibits assisted suicide and euthanasia.1 43
137. Franklin G. Miller et. al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 119, 120 (1994).
138. See HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND
THE DUTCH CURE 47-95 (1997) (citing Psychiater Vrijuit Na Hulp bij Zelfdoding,
ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD (Rotterdam), Apr. 22, 1993, at 1; Psychiater Niet Gestraft voor
Hulp bij Zeldoding, VoIJsKRANT, Apr. 22, 1993, at 1; W. Drozdiak, Dutch Seek Freer
Mercy Killing, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at A29.).
139. Id. at 48; see also CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA
AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 37-38 (1991).
140. See id. at 60.
141. See id at 66-67.
142. See id. at 67.
143. Id. at 47.
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The acquittal of Dr. Chabot demonstrates the slippery slope that
recognizing physician assisted suicide as a liberty interest
presents. The first stage in the slippery slope was when the
Netherlands permitted euthanasia and physician assisted suicide
for terminally ill patients. Because Dutch courts based this on a
doctor's responsibility to help a patient and to put the patient's
welfare above the law, the Dutch courts logically had to permit
euthanasia and physician assisted suicide for physically healthy
patients. Dr. Chabot's patient was not even mentally ill; she
merely was upset. On these facts, Dr. Chabot determined that
giving his patient pills to hasten her death was putting her wel-
fare above the law. The Dutch court condoned Dr. Chabot's
determination.
Dr. Chabot's patient's choice to end her life was one of "the
most intimate and personal choices" she would make in her life-
time; it was "a choice central to personal dignity and autonomy";
and it was part of defining her "own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
However, is American jurisprudence ready to accept that an
upset person who is mentally competent and physically healthy
has a right to physician assisted suicide? If not, the Court should
read the mystery passage narrowly. If the Court were to read the
passage broadly, the Court logically would have to recognize the
right in physician assisted suicide and euthanasia, and eventually
allow mentally competent and physically healthy people to exer-
cise that right. Thus, by reading the quotation narrowly, the
Court declines to travel down the slippery slope.
For patients that are terminally ill and suffering unbearable
pain, we need to improve our palliative care. Indeed, requests
for physician assisted suicide may be due to inadequate palliative
care. The New York Task Force discovered that doctors can treat
those patients who request physician assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia for depression and their pain.144 Moreover, after the doc-
tors treated the patients, the patients usually withdrew their
request to die. 145 Courts should not think that honoring a
patient's request for physician assisted suicide is the only solution
to a patient's suffering. We can develop and administer better
palliative care.
Sedler and others, however, have argued that the law has
already granted the right to hasten one's own death because the
144. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH
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law allows removal of life support. Sedler compared physician
assisted suicide with withdrawing life support. He argued that
there is no "principled difference... between the right of a com-
petent terminally ill person to hasten inevitable death by refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment and the right of the same com-
petent terminally ill person to hasten inevitable death by the use
of physician-prescribed medication." '14 6  Kamisar, however,
argued that if there is no principled difference, then the right to
hasten one's death cannot consistently be limited to those who
are terminally ill because the right to refuse medical treatment
has no such limitation. 1 47 We cannot ground the right to hasten
one's own death in the similarity with the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining medical treatment. If we do so, we will travel down the
slippery slope where we will confer that right to those not termi-
nally ill. The courts did not limit withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment to the terminally ill. No reason suggests that
physician assisted suicide would be different.
Sedler went on to note that the opponents of physician
assisted suicide often support their argument with the govern-
ment's interest in "preserving life. ' 14s Sedler argued, however,
that the government should not intrude on the terminally ill per-
son's choice to hasten the person's own death because for these
people there is no life to preserve.1 49 The life ahead of a termi-
nally ill person can seem grim. For example, the terminally ill
patients in Compassion in Dying struggled with a painful and bleak
existence. 5 ' However, the law should preserve life. The law
should not suggest that terminally ill people have nothing left to
offer society and that therefore society should dismiss them.
Jurisprudence that recognizes a right to hasten one's own death
can only send a negative message to those who face a difficult
existence. Although this does not mandate opposing physician
assisted suicide, it is another persuasive factor.
Judge Reinhardt in Compassion in Dying tried to alleviate the
slippery slope concerns in recognizing a liberty interest in has-
tening one's own death. He wrote:
since doctors are highly-regulated professionals, it should
not be difficult for the state or the profession itself to estab-
lish rules and procedures that will ensure that the occa-
sional negligent or careless recommendation by a licensed
146. Sedler, supra note 131, at 729.
147. See Kamisar, supra note 132, at 741.
148. See Sedler, supra note 131, at 729-30.
149. See id. at 730.
150. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794-95 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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physician will not result in an uninformed or erroneous
decision by the patient or his family."'
Moreover, Judge Reinhardt argued that the Supreme Court has
not refused "to recognize a substantive due process liberty right
or interest merely because there were difficulties in determining
when and how to limit its exercise or because others might some-
day attempt to use it improperly." '5 2 Judge Reinhardt believes
that concerns about how a person exercises a liberty right should
not prohibit a court determining that such a liberty right exists.
For example, concerns about how a woman would exercise her
liberty interest to terminate a pregnancy-although the concerns
are very important-should not determine ultimately whether
such a liberty interest exists. A person can take any right to an
illogical extreme. Moreover, Judge Reinhardt recognized that
the slippery slope fears which the opponents of Roe voiced have
not materialized.
1 53
We know, however, the slippery slope concerns with physi-
cian assisted suicide have materialized. The Dutch experiment
with physician assisted suicide provides a real example of the slip-
pery slope. Herbert Hendin noted that "[o]nce the Dutch per-
mitted assisted suicide, it was not possible medically, legally or
morally to deny more active medical help such as euthanasia to
individuals who could not effect their own deaths."' 5 4 Although
the slippery slope concerns voiced in Roe did not materialize, the
slippery slope concerns regarding physician assisted suicide did
materialize in the Netherlands. The events in the Netherlands
adds credence to the slippery slope concerns here in America.
Regarding physician assisted suicide, judges should consider
the concerns about the slippery slope. Judges do not decide
cases in a vacuum; people must implement judges' decisions in
the world around us. Deciding a case purely on theoretical
grounds can lead to absurd results when people implement that
decision. Where neither judicial precedent nor the history or
traditions of our nation establish a liberty interest, judges should
consider the concerns about the slippery slope. Otherwise, in
such a case, a judge would be in danger of deciding a case in a
vacuum, purely on theoretical grounds. The judge would be in
danger of making a practically absurd ruling. Practicality should
be a desired attribute of a court's decision.
151. Id. at 827.
152. Id. at 831.
153. See id.
154. Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DuQ. L.REv
427 (1996).
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At first glance, however, physician assisted suicide seems rea-
sonable. Denying a terminally ill person who endures unman-
ageable suffering the right to exit this world quickly and with
dignity is difficult. However, framing the issue in this charged
manner is an appeal to emotion. The inevitable ramifications of
recognizing a right to physician assisted suicide overwhelm any
such decision. If we recognize a right to physician assisted sui-
cide for a terminally ill person, we eventually will recognize such
a right for a chronically ill person. If we recognize a right to
physician assisted suicide for a chronically ill person, we eventu-
ally will recognize such a right for a mentally competent and
physically healthy person. Therefore, if we legalize physician
assisted suicide, we eventually will legalize active euthanasia.
Thus, recognizing a right to physician assisted suicide inevitably
would start us-down the slippery slope.
V. CONCLUSION
Before the Court spoke on the issue in Glucksberg, propo-
nents of physician assisted suicide claimed that the right to
hasten one's own death naturally followed from the Court's prior
decisions. These proponents claimed that the mystery passage
almost proscribed finding a liberty interest in physician assisted
suicide. The Court in Glucksberg, however, refused to recognize
such a liberty interest, and said that the mystery passage does not
support classifying all intimate and personal choices as liberty
interests. Although the importance of the decisions to terminate
a pregnancy and to hasten one's death may be similar, and both
decisions may be the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son will make in a lifetime, the Court refused to hold that the
decision to hasten one's death is a liberty interest. Moreover, in
clarifying its substantive due process analysis, the Court stressed
the importance of the history and traditions of our nation.
We should not allow a person to define her existence
through hastening her death not only because legal precedent
does not establish such a liberty interest, but also because it does
not make sense ethically. America is not a society where one eth-
ical system controls all; rather, there is an amalgam of ethical
systems. However, some core moral standards exist that are com-
mon to all ethical systems. The mystery passage reflects two com-
peting core moral standards: supporting autonomy and
refraining from killing. The history and traditions of our nation
have not supported autonomy such that we will allow a person to
commit suicide. In this instance, our collected ethical system val-
ues refraining from killing more than supporting autonomy.
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Therefore, the law should not recognize a liberty interest in has-
tening one's death because it would produce a schism between
constitutional law and moral theory.
Reading the mystery passage broadly and recognizing a lib-
erty interest in physician assisted suicide also will lead to undesir-
able results. As the Dutch experienced in the Netherlands,
doctors eventually would be able to aid in the suicide of a men-
tally competent and physically healthy person. The dangers for
abuse are too prevalent to allow a liberty interest in physician
assisted suicide. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring
opinion in Glucksberg, even if hastening one's death was a liberty
interest, significant state interests would allow a state to prohibit
its practice.
In sum, judges should read the mystery passage narrowly,
and not remove it from its context in Casey. Not all intimate and
personal choices are liberty interests merely because of the lan-
guage in the mystery passage. Supreme Court precedent, moral
philosophy and practical realities do not suggest an other than
narrow reading of the mystery passage.
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